

## VSP Public Comment

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**From:** joekam@ix.netcom.com  
**Sent:** Sunday, June 26, 2005 9:40 PM  
**To:** Secretary of State, Constituent Affairs  
**Cc:** McDannold, Bruce  
**Subject:** Standards for AVVPAT

Should California reject the proposed Diebold system? Vote=Yes

Contrary to the AVVPAT proposal described below I believe that a simpler but adequate "paper trail" is provided by using only a machine-readable paper ballot to be marked by the voter. I do not know what proportion of the state's precincts use such paper ballots, but a description of the alternative to the AVVPAT proposal below may be worth considering.

The method of vote tallying used by San Francisco would seem to prevent nearly all problems of illegal tampering of the programming of the machines, and can eliminate errors of manual recounting of votes. After the voter is verified as eligible to vote at his precinct polling place and signs in, he receives a machine-readable paper ballot which requires the voter to fill in spaces with a marking pencil to indicate his choices. The completed ballot is inserted into the voting machine by the voter. The machine keeps a count of the ballots inserted and reads and records each of the voter's choices and keeps running totals of all votes. The machine places each ballot it has read in a sealed compartment in the machine. At the end of the voting day, the election workers open the sealed container, count the number of ballots and verify that the count matches both the number of signed-in voters as well as the number of ballots counted by the machine. The ballots are then sent by !

deputized courier to the central election office, along with the sealed electronic record in the voting machine. At the central office all voted ballots are kept to make possible a needed recount. Thus the ballots themselves are the paper trail. A machine certified to be free of tampering of its internal programming for vote reading and tallying can do the recount. This method would eliminate the expense, delays and errors of manual recounting, and stop illegal alteration of the finally approved programming of the voting machines in the polling places. Improperly marked ballots will, of course, require individualized attention, and standard rules for interpreting or rejecting all or part of such ballots must be used.

The ballot reading machine program would be certified as reliable by a panel of experts hired by the State. The panel would have no ties to the program vendor. Once the panel approves the program, any subsequent modifications of it without the express authorization of the agency should be prohibited. Inspections should be conducted by the panel to assure compliance. Access to source code would be helpful, but unless it is known only to a few members of the panel, it could encourage many parties other than the vendors to attempt illegal modifications. Preservation of the integrity of the programming, whether it is open or not, would seem to require that the panel will be a public agency, subject to overview by another public body. This problem needs study.

As for internet involvement, until such time as errorless voter identification methods and encryption or other methods are developed to provide complete protection of the transmitted vote from illegal tampering, internet participation in voting seems premature.

Mr. Joe Kamiya  
20 Encline Court  
San Francisco, CA 94127

### Citizen Proposed Standards:

The AVVPAT shall be printed on single sheet non-thermal at least 16 pound paper, one record of vote per sheet.

Every recorded vote, no matter how recorded, shall have a AVVPAT copy.

The AVVPAT record of the vote shall be printed in a minimum of 12 point font.

The AVVPAT shall be printed and organized to be easily read by both the voter and election officials.

The AVVPAT during the 1% manual audit and any recount shall be physically verified and hand counted only.

The recorded vote choices on the AVVPAT shall not be audited or recounted by automatic or electronic methods.

There shall not be a method by which any particular voting record can be connected to any particular voter.

Any AVVPAT spoiled or rejected by a voter because of a voting system error shall not be counted as a spoiled ballot under the two spoiled ballots limit.

No remote access to voting machines by wireless or internet.